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In view of the responsibility placed upon the Truman Committee to Investigate the National Defense and War Program, the efficient coordination of the Governmental departments and units to carry on the program, comes well within the jurisdiction of the Committee. This jurisdiction has been recognized as to the emergency war organizations and it is equally important that it be recognized as to the combat organizations. While the Truman Committee wishes to avoid conflict with standing committees, it must be recognized that neither the Committee on Military Affairs nor the Committee on Naval Affairs is in the best situation to consider the problem of unity of command. Both Committees, naturally, will have important views on the subject but, because of their long association with the work of one service rather than the other, their recommendation upon the unification of the commands would not be accepted generally as being as unbiased as would the recommendation of a special committee with broader jurisdiction. Incidentally, the Truman Committee has members on it from each of the standing Committees directly concerned with a part of such problem. Senators Truman, Wallgren and Kilgore are members of the Committee on Military Affairs; Senator Brewster is a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs and Senators Mead, Wallgren and Burton are members of the Committee on Commerce which has peace time jurisdiction over the Coast Guard, the merchant marine and civilian aviation.

While the need of greater unity and continuity of command is especially emphasized by the conditions in Alaska, a consideration of the other fronts merely emphasizes the need for unity of action between

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the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the Naval Sea and Air Forces. There also should be unity of direction for the Army and Navy Services of Supply, both in their relations to one and another and with the civilian producers of their needs.

The Sub-Committee therefore recommends that the whole Committee consider how best to proceed to help the administration secure a general unity of command for the Ground, Sea and Air Forces of the Nation, both in Alaska and elsewhere.

5. Need for additional Air Forces.

At every Station where the Committee stopped, it inquired of the officials in charge, and particularly of the Army and Naval Officers, as to their needs. These varied in detail but at every station there was recognition of the need for additional airplanes and trained men to man them. Often the view was expressed that the post we visited relied upon a supply of air forces from certain other designated places. On visiting those places, however, the Committee did not find the reserve air forces upon which such reliance was being placed.

It is recognized that an air force is mobile. It is constantly shifted from place to place and reserves may be brought up from long distances in a comparatively short time. In no instance, however, did any commander state that he had the number of planes he thought he needed. There was an expectation that within a comparatively short time the air forces would be considerably increased. Even if increased, as now expected, the air forces would not reach the needs of Alaska as

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estimated by those in command.

It is important also to recognize that the needs on the Alaskan front are small in proportion to the needs on other fronts. This should increase our readiness to meet the Alaskan needs. The benefits to be retained and the security to be gained from an adequate development of the Alaskan front are major benefits. In view of the great production of airplanes today in the United States, the Alaskan All-American front should have at least its fair quota of America's own air production. Our allies naturally urge that aid be sent to their fronts. We must not neglect the Alaskan front merely because it has no vigorous allied advocate at the Allied Staff meetings. We owe it to our own people and also to our allies to present fully the needs and merits of the Alaskan front.

Protection of the Alaskan front also is important to the protection of America and of her war industries on the Pacific Coast. For both offensive and defensive purposes the Aleutian Islands are on the great circle shortest route between Seattle and Tokyo. Dutch Harbor is 1940 miles from Seattle and 2840 miles from Tokyo. Kiska, along the same route is 2640 miles from Seattle and only 2140 miles from Tokyo. Similarly, on another great circle through Alaska, Fairbanks is 3240 miles from New York and 3510 miles from Tokyo. The full significance of the ferry route through Fairbanks and the water and air route along the Aleutians involves a recognition of the fact that this is the most direct route that exists to Tokyo. In contrast, the distance from the Solomon Islands to Tokyo is nearly 4000 miles and the Solomon Islands in turn, are over 6000 miles from San Francisco. The Solomon Islands and all the intervening territory between them and Japan

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is protected by substantial Japanese armament, tremendously in excess of any protection that can exist against an attack on Japan from the North.

Any consideration of our approach to Japan from the North and likewise of the approach to the United States by Japan from the North, will emphasize the need for supplying our Alaskan front with whatever ground, sea and air forces are needed to make sure of retaining that front in our control.

6. Needs of the other Branches of the Service.

It is essential that any large scale military undertaking be well balanced. From the opinions obtained by the Committee and its own observations, it would appear that the Ground Forces, both in Alaska and on the Pacific Coast are much more nearly in proportion to the needs of the circumstances than the Air Forces.

The primary need thus far has been to convert a completely unprepared area into a strong defensive area and one in which military movements would be facilitated. To this end, the first need has been for road machinery and construction material. While there are obvious shortages at some points which should be met, the Army Engineer Corps in general has been reasonably well supplied with men and equipment and has done a splendid piece of work. It has had the full cooperation of the combat units in this work and great progress has been made. Transportation facilities have been greatly improved by the construction of roads; strong placements and gun positions have been located and are either completed

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or in the course of rapid construction. While some of the older posts were constructed in a stereotyped manner, all new army posts near the front have been constructed with new emphasis on the dispersal of units. This has been done to such an extent that even where camouflage is not readily available, the dispersion is such that it would be almost impossible for the enemy to do widespread damage through bombing attacks. Where camouflage is available it has been used with exceptional skill and its use is being constantly extended.

The needs of the Navy for expansion of facilities have not been as fully met. Apparently the principal Naval stations have been selected because some previous Naval activity existed at those points. This previous activity was not war time activity and it is generally admitted that the Naval stations thus chosen are not those which probably would have been chosen for purely war purposes.

The Naval stations are being rapidly improved. Much less attention, however, is apparently being given to dispersion or concealment than in the case of the Army. In some cases where the Army units have been widely dispersed and skillfully concealed, the Navy buildings, even in the same area, remain obvious targets. In some instances additional naval construction is going on with ~~scarcely~~ little regard for concealment or dispersion. The new Naval double hangar at Kodiak is an example.

The Navy has but few Engineer Officers and Construction Battalions. In the one instance where a Construction Battalion has been brought in, it apparently is doing an excellent piece of work. To a large extent the Navy depends upon civilian contracts and even here is handicapped by the

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limited supervision it is able to give them.

As a result of the need for construction work, at practically every post, it was necessary for the Government to enter into some large private contracts. Contractors on the Pacific Coast and in the Northwest pooled their resources and endeavored to meet the emergency. Credit should be given them for their initiative and their attempt to meet the needs of the situation under great handicaps. They were unable to bid flat contract prices because of the uncertainty of the cost of material and labor, the uncertainty of the exact work to be undertaken, and the difficulties to be overcome. It was impossible for anyone to survey the situations in detail before getting started. The contracts, therefore, are negotiated contracts on a basis under which the cost is borne by the Government. The high cost of labor and materials and the need for speed has resulted in high cost. This is especially marked wherever it comes in contrast with the work done by the Army Engineer Corps. Absence of skilled supervision and workmanship likewise has increased the cost.

The expense of these civilian contracts to the Government will be enormous and it is probable that there has been substantial wastage in their performance.

It is of the utmost importance to the future standards of performance under these contracts and to the interest of the Government that an investigation be made of them. Because of the great distance from the United States and the emergency nature of the construction, it is likely that there has been a tendency to disregard expense. This is unsound

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public policy just as much as is the wastage of ammunition or armament by troops in action. While substantial wastage may be unavoidable, an excess of waste may lead not only to high costs but to great loss of military advantage. It is just as detrimental as though the wasted facilities had been destroyed by the enemy.

The Sub-Committee therefore recommends an early and complete investigation, on the ground, as well as in Washington^{D.C.} covering both the nature of these contracts and their performance, including both Army and Navy projects.

7. Morale.

High morale at the front and at distant posts is a primary essential of success. At all points visited, the general morale appeared to be unusually high. Specific instances to the contrary will be mentioned later.

The morale among the higher officers of all branches of the service is especially good and they are doing everything possible to cooperate with each other. The Committee also had opportunities to observe the morale of the enlisted men both at the rear and in the most advanced positions. Here again the morale was high in spite of handicaps. The men have been kept extremely busy and feel that they are performing a service important to the conduct of the war. As time goes on and there is less construction work to keep the men busy, the difficulty of maintaining morale at these distant posts will be increased. By that time, however, special facilities for supporting morale undoubtedly will have been improved.

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The men who are under the greatest strain and who are performing the most exceptional service are the Army and Navy fliers who have met extraordinarily difficult weather conditions in addition to the general difficulty of dealing daily with an enemy over 600 miles distant on the Aleutian Islands. These men have displayed extraordinary courage and are deserving of great support and commendation. The needs which they voice are for improved location of firing equipment on planes, the addition of protective equipment such as radars on planes to warn them of obstacles and the general need for more planes and more men. The supplying of additional planes and trained men to fly them would make possible the release from constant duty of fliers who are now being placed under too constant a strain.

Some of the distant and exposed posts need improved mail service. In some cases the Committee found great need of such items as writing paper, candy, soft drinks and soap. The shipment of such articles was postponed in the first instance to allow ^{for} shipment of food, ammunition, equipment, clothing and machinery. There has been a shortage of ships for the necessary transportation and it is necessary to allocate ships so that the most Northerly stations will receive their full winter supplies before shipping is closed. There seems to be no shortage or inferior quality in the ammunition, food or clothing supplies.

If any one item should be selected for special consideration, it is mail. The regular delivery of mail at these points is vital to morale.

Finally, a matter of great interest to the troops, especially those that have been in Alaska for a year or more, is the possibility of

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securing furloughs and leaves of absence under which they may return for a short period to the States. During the visit of the Sub-Committee, authority was secured by the Commanding General, in accordance with his previous request, permitting the granting of a limited number of such furloughs. The news of this contributed immediately and substantially to a better morale.

The instances of lowered morale that came to the attention of the Sub-Committee came largely through its Counsel, Charles P. Clark, during the time he was hospitalized in connection with his accident, or that came to the Sub-Committee members through Army Nurses. These included some cases of suicide and of despondency. The Commanding General indicated that in his opinion there was not an abnormally large number of such cases, and that the general health of the command was excellent.

Investigation at each post indicated that in general the food was excellent and the health of the troops good. At Nome, where the post had been established for only about two weeks, the food and living conditions were less good than elsewhere.

The morale of the fliers and their crews was good, but the constant losses of men and planes from weather as well as the enemy placed an unusually severe strain on them, and showed the extreme need of a system of relief, furloughs and leaves of absence for the men in that service.

8. Needs of the Civilian Population.

The civilian population in some places has been evacuated. In the Pribilof Islands, the need for this is questionable. It has resulted apparently in the destruction of the sealskin industry for the current

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year. Consideration should be given to permitting the return of the eskimos to these islands at least on some limited basis that will not destroy this industry.

A somewhat similar instance exists as to a large number of sheep on one of the outer Aleutian Islands. Provision should be made for their care, either by or for their owners.

Families of men in the military service in Alaska have been returned to their homes and substantial restrictions have been placed on the bringing of new people to Alaska.

The handling of restrictions on civilian travel has caused considerable complaint by civilians in Alaska including Governor Ernest Gruening. The present freedom of Alaska from subversive influences must be preserved. This is particularly important in connection with the civilian contracts and the employment of men on them. At the same time all delays and difficulties connected with travel to Alaska are handicaps to the contractors in securing their needed labor. The convenience of Alaskan residents going to and from the States will be improved by a recent order which permits their receipt of round trip identification certificates. These can be issued by responsible authorities in Alaska, thereby eliminating need for re-investigation on the traveler's return to Alaska.

Censorship has been applied to all of Alaska. The administration of this needs substantial immediate improvement. The Commanding General of the Western Defense Command has announced a policy of permitting publication in Alaskan papers and the receipt by Alaskans of any news that is published in the United States. If this rule is followed it will meet most of the

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present complaint. There apparently is some conflict of authority between the military authorities and the general censorship exercised by the Office of Censorship in Washington, D. C.

The delivery of civilian supplies has been handicapped by lack of transportation. This is important in connection with Northerly stations where, unless the civilians obtain adequate supplies of necessities, such as food, they are likely to become a serious burden upon the military organizations.

A constantly repeated criticism was that liquor and beer supplies had been transported in large quantities to the civilian population to the exclusion of other much more essential items. The Governor of Alaska is making a special investigation of this charge which he deems to be largely unfounded.

VI. PERMANENT INTEREST OF ALASKA AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR PROGRAM

Certain probable effects of the war program on the permanent future of Alaska should at least be noted. Attention accordingly is called to the following points:

1. Improved transportation facilities.

The greatly improved transportation facilities both by air and by road are bound to have a permanent favorable influence on Alaska by providing access to it for all purposes and access to Asia through Alaska.

2. Agricultural Development.

The gradually increasing self-sustaining agricultural

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activity in Alaska is of great permanent importance to it. This increase is due in part to the market provided by war activities. The Matanuska Valley Project has now ceased to be a relief project and is of substantial value as an experiment in Alaskan agriculture. It is assisted by an experimental station under the direction of the University of Alaska and supported to some extent by the Department of Agriculture of the United States.

Alaska would gain substantially by increased technical study and advice supplied now to the Matanuska Valley Project. The Department of Agriculture may well find in this opportunity an important field of development even leading to its taking over the supervision of the entire Matanuska Valley experiment.

Many individual members of the armed services have been attracted by the opportunities in Alaska including the opportunities for settlement there. This may well result in some immigration of soldiers into Alaska with their families after the war. If this is done with the expectation of undertaking self-sustaining agricultural effort, it will be of substantial value to the general development of Alaska.

3. Mineral Resources

The Federal Government is carrying on an investigation of undeveloped mineral resources in Alaska. While this is being pressed especially because of the need for certain minerals for war purposes, it may also have permanent value

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in developing resources for use in time of peace. The improved transportation facilities to Alaska increase the commercial value of all deposits which thereby become more accessible. It may make certain low grade ores commercially available.

VII. CONCLUSION

The Alaskan front is one of critical importance. Major benefits can be obtained by prompt action at a minimum of cost in men and material. Alaska is a key route to Japan and Asia. It is an All-American front in which both the opportunity and the responsibility for its use rests with the American forces and depends upon American policies.

The necessary counter-offensive action to regain control of the Aleutian Islands is really a postponed defensive action of these islands which have been captured from us. The actual reoccupation of the islands from a military standpoint may not be of primary importance but their neutralization so that they can not be used to advantage by the enemy is of great importance. The continued development and control of the entire Aleutian chain of islands for our own possible major offensive operations, and the continued development and control of Northern Alaska for the use of the Ferrying Command as well as for our own possible major offensive operations, are important national policies.

Investigations by the whole Committee which appear justified by the investigation Sub-Committee relating to Alaska and the Pacific Coast, in addition to those previously recommended in the report of August 5, 1942, are the following:

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I. Transportation in Alaska

A. The ALCAN Road (pp 11-15)

1. Cost
2. Suitability for military purposes
3. Suitability for permanent civilian purposes, involving consideration of additional routes for those purposes.

B. ALCOL Project for developing and piping oil supplies (pp 15 & 16)

C. Air Transportation (pp 11 & 12)

1. General plan of development
2. Cost
3. Relation to roads and railroads.

II. Construction of Military and Naval facilities in Alaska (other than the ALCAN road) by private contract. (pp 33-34)

This calls for an investigation of the terms of these contracts, need for them, operations under them, character of supervision over them, and comparison of results with those obtained by Army and Navy construction forces.

III. Unity of Command (pp 24 - 29)

- A. Need for unity of command now for all Alaska
- B. Assistance to the Administration in establishing general unity of command of United States Ground, Sea, Air and Supply Forces.

Respectfully submitted,