

WILLIAM E. ROSENBAUM
CONSULTING TRAFFIC MANAGER
ST. LOUIS, MO.

March 27, 1942.

Mr. Charles P. Clark, Associate Chief Counsel,
Special Committee Investigating The National
Defense Program,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Clark:

Again referring to your letter of February 28th and my reply of March 26th, with reference to suggestions which I have made for improved shipping methods in order to reduce by a period of two months the present elapsed time in transit of aircraft from the United States to the various theaters of war:

As is probably quite obvious to you from the copies of my correspondence with Admiral Land, David Lawrence, and Senator Truman, which is now before you, I am very much discouraged and pessimistic about our shipping situation. This attitude I wish to assure you, however, is not merely the result of the very limited correspondence above referred to, but the product of vigorous but vain efforts which I have been making for the past twelve months to bring about an improvement and modernization in shipping methods and facilities.

The extent and nature of these efforts are very fully explained in the enclosed copy of my letter of September 29, 1941 to the President of the United States together with copies of the attachments thereto. The President did not reply to this letter directly, but I did receive an acknowledgement thereof under date of October 15, 1941 from Col. Aurand as per copy also attached.

In addition you will also find enclosed copies of letters which I wrote to Col. Aurand under date of November 14, 1941 (which was never acknowledged) and to the President under date of November 17, 1941, which was merely courteously acknowledged under date of November 24, 1941 by a Mr. John N. Hazard, Principal Liaison Officer Section for Soviet Supply, Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

In reading copies of the above-referred to letters, you will find frequent reference to a brochure which I prepared last July at the request of some alleged "lend-lease experts" whom I had been led to believe were really interested in more rapid transport in conferences I had with them while in Washington last June. And in order that you may have first hand knowledge of the nature of this brochure, I am taking the liberty of also enclosing my file copy thereof for examination by you. I am thus sending it to you because of the uncertainty of my next trip to Washington.

As you will note from its cover, this brochure contains a suggested plan for rapid coordinated rail-truck-and-ship transportation service to Great Britain. Of course, the principles outlined therein are quite readily adaptable in connection with transportation service elsewhere as well - - for example, to Murmansk, Archangel, Port Said, Australia, Hawaii, Alaska, etc., etc. A brief outline of the possibilities of such operations is incorporated at pages 7 and 8 thereof.

Although, as you will see from the enclosed copies of correspondence, I have been informed the suggestions made by me were supposed to be receiving consideration, I cannot help but feel that nothing more than a merely perfunctory glance was ever given to the brochure by the officers of my own government as contrasted with a very thorough study which I am informed is being made by the British government. If there were any real and genuine interest in improving shipping methods by those to whom my suggestions were referred, it is my opinion I would have been interrogated for more information regarding details of operations, etc. which I might have in mind. But believe it or not, I have not been asked a single question.

In this connection, it may interest you to know that prior to compiling this brochure and making my various suggestions, I was informed by friends* connected with the Interstate Commerce Commission where I spend most of my time when in Washington that I was wasting my time and attempting something which would prove to be in vain. It was only natural for me to feel at the time that perhaps they would prove to be mistaken - - but they were right, and that is why we now have bottle necks at our ports in connection with foreign transport.

Permit me to inform you further that the ideas which I have incorporated in this brochure are not original with me but, on the contrary, are merely an elaboration of suggestions and recommendations made a number of years ago by Hon. Joseph B. Eastman and members of his staff when he was Federal Coordinator of Transportation with a view of improving domestic transportation service. All that I have done is to extend the application of the ideas, recommendations and suggestions contained in his reports to foreign as well as domestic transport.

In fact, before promulgating this brochure I informed Mr. Eastman personally while in his office one day last May on another matter that I had been using his name in vain in connection with some suggestions I had made the previous day to one of Admiral Land's lieutenants for improving transport to Great Britain. And, following a brief outline of these suggestions to him he remarked that the only possible drawback he could then see to my plan was the possibility that the Newfoundland Railway, which I suggested using as an important link in the coordinated through service, might not be capable of handling the vast amount of traffic over its rails which would be involved. But I informed Mr. Eastman then and I still think that if it is not built to handle a large volume of traffic, military considerations and the important savings in time, shipping space, etc., etc., should be sufficient incentive to improve its physical structure and thus make it a very important transportation link.

The manner in which the Newfoundland Railway should be used is outlined at pages 5, 6, and 37, of the enclosed brochure. To me it appears that it is as important a link in the shipping program of the United Nations as is the Burma Road to China in that its use will reduce the water haul on materiel to Europe by a thousand or more miles compared with other routes now used more extensively and at great hazard to our shipping.

I trust I have not bored you with this long recital of my efforts to find some fertile ground in Washington in which to plant some ideas for increasing the efficiency of our shipping operations. Most certainly if present bottle necks at our ports continue to get worse, and if our shipping generally continues to get worse as it has right along, then it is hardly likely that we will win the war. There is no use in producing vast quantities of war materials if we can't get them where they are needed. But if you are interested in knowing

*Not including Mr. Eastman, however.


Mr. Charles P. Clark - - Page 3:

more of the details of what I have in mind and desire that I do so, I shall be only too glad to make a special trip to Washington at my own expense for the purpose of explaining them.

And, I say to you as I say to everyone, that any officer of the government who is unwilling to consider or do everything possible to effect a marked improvement in our shipping situation is not putting forth every effort at his command to win the war. The building of more and more ships is not the solely important factor in the shipping program; but what is of equal importance is the adoption and proper execution of methods and the installation of facilities which will improve the overall efficiency of ship operations through increased turn-arounds and quicker loading and discharge of cargo.

In conclusion, permit me to suggest that you endeavor to visualize what would happen to transportation in the New York metropolitan area, for example, if the immense amount of freight handled there and transported on vehicles using the numerous vehicular ferries operating in New York harbor were to discontinue present methods of rolling these vehicles and their cargoes on and off such ferries, and the substitution in lieu thereof of the antiquated hatch loading and discharging methods now used on our so-called Liberty ships. The adoption of such a substitute at New York is, of course, unthinkable. By the same token then isn't it rather unthinkable that the Liberty ships should continue to use the ancient and antiquated loading and discharging methods which probably date back to the time of the Phoenicians?

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "W. S. Rosenbaum". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

WER Encl.

WILLIAM E. ROSENBAUM
CONSULTING TRAFFIC MANAGER
ST. LOUIS, MO.

November 17, 1941.

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The President of the United States,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Please note the attached copy of letter together with enclosures which I have sent to Colonel H. S. Aurand today and which is self-explanatory.

I am sending this to you because a matter of this kind may not come under Colonel Aurand's jurisdiction.

Frankly, it is quite obvious to me and many others that unless and until more efficient and expeditious transportation is made effective soon, the tremendous quantities of materials and supplies which are intended for the aid of Great Britain, Russia, etc., will reach them TOO LATE. It can not be denied that this is almost entirely a war of transportation and the adoption of better methods of transportation than now exists are as important as production. To bring about improved transportation to foreign countries was the underlying reason which prompted the compilation of my proposed plan for rapid coordinated rail-truck-and-ship transportation service to Great Britain, dated July 9, 1941, and which I mentioned in my letter to you of September 29, 1941. And, while this plan suggested improved methods for operation to the British Isles, the principles contained therein are equally applicable to Russia, Iran, Africa, or any other part of the world.

In fact, no progress seems to have been made in this matter since my first letter to you dated March 25, 1941, and you must pardon me for being rather skeptical that your lieutenants are giving the suggestions which I have made the attention they deserve. I do not know whether the people who are supposed to be considering my brochure are practical transportation men, but I do know that practical transportation men not connected with the United States Government, all the way from London, England to San Francisco, California, who have seen, examined and studied my plan, as contained in the previously mentioned brochure, say it is practical.

Respectfully,

WER/k
Encl. 2.

WILLIAM E. ROSENBAUM
CONSULTING TRAFFIC MANAGER
ST. LOUIS, MO.

November 17, 1941.

Colonel M. S. Aurand,
Defense Aid Director,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel:

Thanks for your letter of October 15th acknowledging my letter of September 29th to the President of the United States with respect to my proposed plan for rapid coordinated rail-truck-and-ship transportation service to Great Britain.

In this connection permit me to invite your attention to the enclosed copy of clipping from yesterday's issue of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and particularly to the portion of this article which I have underlined and which reads as follows:

"British and American military engineers in the Middle East are struggling now with the maddening problems of transporting over railroads of different gauges, unloading and loading where the tracks meet; shipping by truck across gaps in railroads that end in a wilderness."

If the above quoted statement is correct then please permit me to refer you to page 37 of my brochure of July 9th which shows that if the system of transportation suggested by me were to be adopted, the matter of operating over railroads of different gauges and in coordinated rail-and-truck service is comparatively easy of solution.

The manner in which the operation can be applied in so far as railways of different gauges are concerned and in coordinated rail-and-truck service are clearly illustrated in the pictures contained at pages 18 to 29, inclusive, of this brochure.

Of course, I have no way of knowing whether or not the military engineers, purported in this article to be now in the Middle East, have studied my suggested plan but I feel reasonably sure that were they afforded an opportunity, the simplicity of the proposed plan and the solution of their problem would be quite obvious to them.

There is hardly any doubt but what it is going to be necessary to build a lot of new steamships, thousands of new railway cars for operation in these far distant lands, as well as thousands of new motor trucks and I respectfully submit that as long as these tremendous quantities of new vehicles are to be built, they should be constructed in such a manner as to afford relief from the present inefficient methods of operation so clearly illustrated at pages 9 and 10 of my brochure.

Please do not hesitate to ask me questions regarding anything contained in this brochure which may not appear clear to you or your staff.

Very truly yours,