

(Lack of training in coordination of tanks with Infantry and Artillery.)

General Gilliam, the new Commanding General here, has pushed many points involved. (General Gilliam has now been moved to another post.) There are confidential letters rebuffing his request for certain items of modern equipment. We only have a couple of Armored Divisions and a few tank battalions under us. As such, we could hardly tell AGF that they were not properly arming or training Infantry Divisions. A recent order will put tank battalions with some infantry units. That is a result of this headquarters. The fact that this has come so late is of itself a substantiation of what I say.

We have proposed a suitable Headquarters for Armored Division Artillery so we can mass fires and were verbally rebuffed by General Lentz. There would be no point in again proposing it - as he might kill it permanently. We are building up added factual data and attempting to overcome the reaction of General Lentz that way. But there isn't time for such things. This command has, to my knowledge, tried since last spring to get a battalion of tanks sent to Field Artillery School so they could further work out their famous "massing of fires" technique in conjunction with tanks. We know how we can restore the full mobility of tanks - we want the details taught our Artillery officers. They must be worked out - yet nothing happens. I know General Lentz is killing it by putting it off. So much is secret and confidential I cannot give you more points. Production of correspondence between this Headquarters and AGF will prove these points. Some will show General McNair's approach to problems, such as tanks, is defensive.

(Tanks necessary to protect Infantry - even though anti-tank guns are now effective.)

I am enclosing herewith an article from Field Artillery Journal by the brilliant Col. Lanza about the use of artillery and tanks in the current Russian campaign. Take the figures on tanks and the amount of armor used and you have a complete answer to our antiquated thinkers. It is probably correct to say that the recent reduction in tank production was made for strategic reasons, but those reasons will not hold up. Anti-tank guns are good. But a comprehensive artillery (both massed and direct fire) will reduce them. Our tanks can then get our Infantry forward. Our infantry cannot advance without them - unless we take excessive casualties. Our infantry rebels at wasting themselves when they know there is a less costly way. Wait until the story is written.

In this connection, only yesterday I talked to a brilliant Captain who fought through Africa. He is visiting in Louisville



recuperating from wounds - will be back at Walter Reed in two weeks. He will tell the futility of infantry attack unassisted. He is from a brilliant and prominent family. He will tell you many of our Generals lack any conception of armor - they weren't present to see what it accomplished when it really functioned. Remember when first put in Africa, the 1st Armored Division was split up - piecemeal - a fatal error - and otherwise misused by the higher headquarters.

As to the technological development of tanks by the Germans, it would be interesting to compare the statistics on the penetration of our anti-tank guns in Italy with the figures on the armor thickness of the Mark VI, Ferdinand, and Grizzly Bear tanks of the Germans. To say that it is technologically impractical to armor tanks heavy enough to stand anti-tank fire is not to approach the problem right. A satisfactory fire plan will reduce the anti-tank guns, but infantry will be slaughtered by enemy automatic weapons when the artillery fire lifts. We must have tanks, and more tanks to take ground. Infantry can then hold it. Dug in they have armored protection in the form of earth. To say we cannot build big tanks is to say in Naval Warfare we can't build ships, that naval guns will not penetrate, so do not have ships.

(Russian and British use of armored cars and artillery superior to ours.)

Our Army doesn't go for Armored personnel carriers. British and Russians do - compare the number used in British and Russian divisions with those in our infantry division. We have unarmored units - another example of wasteful practices as far as manpower goes.

The Russians make much greater use of artillery than we do. We have some guns of big calibers - but the field artillery school has been unable to get AGF to authorize a course to indoctrinate high commanders on its use. Our air force is great but for long periods of time it cannot provide the accurate fire support that artillery can. It has to take the distant targets that our artillery will not reach. I know of no one or no doctrine in our Army that covers the use of artillery as the Russians use it. They not only mass it for indirect fire, but they move up a lot of direct fire artillery - and overwatch their tank attacks. We are pushing the development of such a doctrine at Field Artillery School, but the help from AGF is almost nil. I can explain it to you in a conversation - it is difficult to write.