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HUGH FULTON, CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

SPECIAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

November 23, 1943

Truman Com

Honorable Harley M. Kilgore
U. S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harley:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of today, I enclose a copy of the confidential report which Senator Wallgren and I submitted to the Truman Committee on August 28, 1942 containing the confidential preliminary findings and recommendations which we made as a sub-committee at that time.

Page six of the report refers to the conference which we had on August 10, at Edmonton, with Colonel Wyman and the contractor relating to the ALCOL project to obtain oil at Norman Wells at Great Bear Lake and to build refineries for it at Whitehorse.

Section IV of the report on pages 11 - 17 deal with the road and improved air transportation facilities. Pages 15 - 17 deal expressly with the ALCOL pipe line, and contains the express recommendation that this subject as well as the road call for further investigation.

The confidential discussion of the "Offensive and Defensive Program for Alaska" is contained in Section V, Pages 18 - 38.

With personal and cordial regards,

Yours sincerely,

Harold H. Burton

HHB:rin

*What I mention as the ALCOL line is
evidently what you refer to as the CANOL line.*

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CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, D. C.
August 28, 1942.

To: Honorable Harry S. Truman, Chairman and
Members of the Special Committee to
Investigate the National Defense Program.

From: Senators M. C. Wallgren and Harold M. Burton
with Charles P. Clark, Counsel.

Subject: Confidential preliminary findings and
recommendations of Sub-Committee design-
ated for investigation of conditions in
Alaska.

I. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION AND TRIP

This trip was taken in conjunction with the trip to Alaska which was made at the same time by a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, consisting of Senator A. B. Chandler, Chairman, Senator M. C. Wallgren and Senator E. C. Holman, accompanied by George W. Malone, Consultant for the Committee on Military Affairs. It was expected until the last moment that Senator Carl A. Hatch would also accompany Senators Wallgren and Burton on behalf of the Truman Committee, as he had joined with them in the work of the Sub-Committee on Aviation and Light Metals in its investigation on the Pacific Coast from July 20 - August 3, 1942, as reported in the confidential report of that Sub-Committee dated August 5, 1942. He was, however, unable at the last moment to make the trip.

The expenses of Senator Wallgren, who is also a Member of the Committee on Military Affairs, were borne by that Committee. The expenses of Senator Burton were borne by the Truman Committee, but there was no expense charged

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for transportation during the trip from August 9 - 24 as the trip was made in an Army plane provided for this purpose.

In addition to the four Senators on the two Sub-Committees which visited Alaska, and in addition to Messrs. Clark and Malone connected with these Committees, the party included among others, Colonel Carl A. Russell and Lieutenant J. S. Culbertson, representing the United States Army General Staff, Captain H. T. Myers, as Pilot of the Army plane assigned to the trip, First Lieutenant J. R. Hawley as Co-Pilot, Second Lieutenant E. F. Smith, as Special Alaska Pilot, and Sergeants C. A. Horton and F. A. Winslow. In addition to these, there were at various times two or three other members of the trip assigned to it by Army officials or invited by the Chairman of the Military Affairs Sub-Committee. Senator Chandler acted as Chairman of the party during the trip and Colonel Russell as his Executive Officer.

All members of the Party were given the fullest cooperation by the Army and Navy and by all civilians, whether in official capacities or not, with whom they came in contact. Members of the party conferred personally with officers and enlisted men on the front line and in practically every branch of the service. We were given all information that we requested whether or not of a confidential nature and thus were enabled to carry out fully the purpose of investigating the Alaskan military situation and also all subjects in Alaska coming within the broad jurisdiction of the Truman Committee to Investigate the National Defense and War Program under Senate Resolution Number 71.

The Sub-Committee on Military Affairs is submitting a separate

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confidential report to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Senators Wallgren and Burton, as Members of the Truman Committee, submit this confidential report to the Chairman and Members of the Truman Committee as a whole. The investigation on behalf of the Truman Committee was made especially with a view to determining the effectiveness of the Defense and War Program and with a view to recommending what, if any, subjects in Alaska should be made the subject of a special investigation and report. The investigation fell into three general classifications. First, the new Alaskan road known as "ALCAN" and the activities related to it; Second, the operations on the Aleutian Islands and along the pan handle which constitutes Alaska's Southerly shore line, and Third, the permanent interests of Alaska as affected by the war program. The subjects will be reported upon in the above order following a brief summary of the mileage and itinerary of the trip.

II. SUMMARY OF MILEAGE

<u>August</u>			<u>Miles</u>
7th	Conference with Lt. Gen. J. L. DeWitt at Presidio, of San Francisco, Calif.	By train	
8th & 9th	San Francisco to Everett, Washington	By train	700
9th	Everett to Spokane, Washington	By army plane	225
10th	Spokane to Edmonton, Alberta	By army plane	450
11th	Edmonton to Watson Lake, Y.T.	By army plane	750
12th	Watson Lake to Whitehorse, Y.T. to Fairbanks, Alaska	By army plane	670
13th	At Fairbanks		0
14th	Fairbanks to Nome to Anchorage	By army plane	1095
15th	Anchorage to Cold Bay	By army plane	650

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<u>August</u>			<u>Miles</u>
16th	Cold Bay to Unalakleet and return	By army and navy planes	640
17th	Cold Bay to Kodiak	By army plane	400
18th	Kodiak to Anchorage	By army plane	275
19th	Anchorage to Matanuska Valley and return	By automobile	100
20th	Anchorage to Juneau	By army plane	600
21st	Juneau to Sitka and return	By navy plane	250
22nd	At Juneau		0
23rd	Juneau to Everett, Washington	By army plane	900
24th	Everett to San Francisco, Calif.	By army plane	700
25th	Conference with Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt at Presidio, of San Francisco		
7 - 25 Inclusive	(19 days)	Total Mileage	8405
9 - 24 Inclusive	(16 days)	Total Mileage by air	7605
12 - 23 Inclusive	(12 days)	In Alaska, Mileage by air	4800

During the above trip the Committee visited each point of importance to the war program, both on the way to, and in Alaska. It devoted to each point such time as was necessary to confer with the responsible officials in charge and to make such other investigations as were necessary to carry out the purposes of the trip. Only one day of delay was suffered on account of weather. This was August 22nd, when the party was compelled to stay over in Juneau on account of fog. That day was devoted to additional conferences

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with Governor Ernest Gruening of Alaska and other officials, and to the investigation of conditions in and around Juneau.

The entire party traveled substantially as a unit until reaching Kodiak. From that point, Senators Chandler and Holman proceeded by Navy destroyer, Coast Guard boat and regular commercial boat and railroad transportation to San Francisco, thus omitting the second stop at Anchorage, the trips to Matanuska Valley, Juneau and Sitka, but enabling them to confer with officials of the Navy and Coast Guard on duty in Alaska.

Under advice of the medical officer at Cold Bay, Charles F. Clark did not accompany the party on August 16th and in order to rejoin the party promptly at Anchorage, proceeded on that day from Cold Bay on an Army bomber as a part of a group flight. This party encountered bad weather before reaching Anchorage and four of the ships landed at Maknek. In making the landing, two of the ships were damaged, including the one carrying Charles F. Clark. Most of the crew on both ships were injured. One man on the plane which did not carry Mr. Clark was killed. Mr. Clark and the pilot of his plane fortunately escaped with comparatively slight injuries. Mr. Clark conferred at some length with officers and enlisted men of the Air Corps while he was recuperating at Maknek. He rejoined the party at Anchorage on August 19th and continued the trip with it.

III. ITINERARY FROM SPOKANE, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 10th THROUGH
ALASKA TO RETURN TO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., AUGUST 24th, 1942.

Monday		
August 10	<u>Spokane, Washington to Edmonton, Alberta</u>	By army plane 450 miles
	A. Conference at Spokane with Major Gen. Robert Olds and Staff.	

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- B. Visit with American Consul and Canadian officers at Edmonton, Alberta.
 - C. Conference with Colonel Wyman and contractor as to ALCOOL project to obtain oil at Norman Wells near Great Bear Lake, Northwest Territory, and to build refineries for it at Whitehorse, Y.T.

Tuesday
August 11

Edmonton to Watson Lake, Y. T.

By army plane
750 miles

- A. Observation of ALCAN road from Pouce Coupe to Fort St. John to Fort Nelson to vicinity of Watson Lake.
- B. Visit to airfield, camp and radio equipment at Watson Lake.

Wednesday
August 12

Watson Lake to Whitehorse, Y. T. to Fairbanks, Alaska.

By army plane
670 miles

- A. Observation of ALCAN road from vicinity of Watson Lake to Whitehorse and Big Delta.
- B. Conference at Whitehorse with Brig. Gen. W. M. Hoge, in charge of construction of ALCAN road.
- C. Investigation of airfield and lack of ground protection at Whitehorse, Y.T. by Canadian or other forces.

Thursday
August 13

At Fairbanks (Ladd Field)

- A. Conference with Colonel J. V. Hart, just assuming command, Colonel H. H. Carr, just relinquishing command, and Staff.
- B. Conference with Major Gen. S. B. Buckner, Commanding General of Alaska Defense Command.
- C. Investigation of facilities at Ladd Field, including recently greatly increased facilities and those planned in order to convert Fairbanks into a general air depot.
- C. Inspection of special facilities such as eskimo

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dogs, underground tunnels, etc. used in connection with Ladd Field as an experimental field for airplanes in cold weather. The Committee was advised that the use of Ladd Field for this purpose had been discontinued, but advice has since been received that such experimentation is to be resumed and the Field used for that purpose this winter.

- B. Special effort was made here to consider the morale of the troops at this point which is furthest North of the substantial U. S. Army posts in Alaska. To this end conferences were held with men, especially from the States of Kentucky, Washington, Oregon and Ohio, visits made to the hospital and to the radio station, K F A R, which is operated in Fairbanks. The education and recreation service for the troops takes part in preparing and presenting programs for this Station. One of these was presented on the air that evening for one half hour by ten enlisted men and three local girls entitled, "We Know What We Are Fighting For".

Friday
August 14

Fairbanks to Nome to Anchorage. (Fort Richardson and Elmendorf Field.)

By army plane
1095 miles

- A. Inspection of new garrison of about 2300 men at Nome (Population about 900) and conference with Lt. Col. Dudley and Captain Maupin, in charge of Ground and Air Services.
- B. Conferences with civilian population as to food and other facilities.
- C. Reports received as to a visit on the preceding day by Russian officers connected with an investigation of the Ferrying Command and proposed plans for the same.

Saturday
August 15

Anchorage to Cold Bay (Fort Randall)

By army plane
650 miles

- A. Conference with Maj. Gen. S. B. Buckner at Anchorage.
- B. Stopped at Naknek for weather report and inspection of landing field.

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- C. Conference at Cold Bay with Brig. Gen. Lloyd E. Jones and Col. E. W. Jones, of Engineer Corps.
- D. Inspection of widely dispersed facilities and Radar Station.

Sunday
August 16

Cold Bay to Umanak (Fort Glenn) and Dutch Harbor (Fort Mears) and return.

By army & navy
planes 640 miles

- A. Conferences at Cold Bay with men from Kentucky, Washington, Oregon, Ohio and Nevada.
- B. At Umanak, conference with Brig. Gen. J. A. Ladd as to general situation at Umanak.
- C. Inspection of defense facilities at Umanak.
- D. Conference with Major A. J. Starkey and Lt. Speer of Army Bombing Force as to air fighting conditions.
- E. Trip from Umanak to Dutch Harbor in Navy PB1 amphibian plane and return.
- F. Conference with Brig. Gen. Calliday and other Army and Navy officers as to conditions at Dutch Harbor.
- G. Inspection of defense facilities at Dutch Harbor and of damage done by Japanese air raids of June 3rd and 4th.
- H. At Cold Bay, further conference with Col. E. W. Jones of Engineer Corps.
- I. At Naknek, Charles P. Clark, who had proceeded by special Army bomber flight, was injured when the plane carrying him was wrecked in landing in bad weather.

Monday
August 17

Cold Bay to Kodiak (Fort Greasey)

By army plane
400 miles

- A. At Cold Bay, inspection of hospital facilities.
- B. At Kodiak, detailed inspection of gun placements,

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camouflaged huts and buildings. Army facilities, in general, much better camouflaged than Navy, which has large exposed hangars and other facilities.

- C. Conference with Brig. Gen. C. H. Corlett, Commanding General, Army Forces, and Brig. Gen. Butler, commanding air services.
- D. Reception tendered by Brig. Gen. Corlett and Mr. Whiting, of civilian contractors.

Tuesday
August 18

Kodiak to Anchorage

By Army plane
275 miles

- A. Conferences at Kodiak with men from Kentucky, Washington, Oregon and Ohio.
- B. Conference at Naval Headquarters with Rear Admiral Reeves and Brig. Gen. Corlett and Staff.
- C. Brief visit with Rear Admiral Theobald.
- D. Conference with Lt. Commander I. A. Bickelhaupt, in charge of supervision of civilian contracts by Navy and work of Naval Construction Battalion.
- E. Senators Chandler and Holman proceeded from Kodiak to Juneau directly by Naval destroyer and from Juneau by Coast Guard boat.
- F. Charles F. Clark rejoined party at Anchorage, after accident of August 16th.

Wednesday
August 19

Anchorage to Matanuska Valley project and return.

By automobile
100 miles

- A. Conference with Major Gen. S. B. Buckner as to operations on Aleutian Islands.
- B. Trip to Palmer, principal settlement in the Matanuska Valley project and conferences with officials of that project.
- C. Conferences with representatives of air service, engaged in active bombing on Aleutian Islands.

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D. Conference with Federal Judge as to local conditions.

Thursday
August 20

Anchorage to Juneau

By army plane
600 miles

- A. Conference with Governor Ernest Greuning of Alaska.
- B. Reception tendered at Governor's Mansion for party to meet Federal officials and local civilians.

Friday
August 21

Juneau to Sitka and return.

By navy plane
250 miles

- A. Conference with Governor Ernest Greuning of Alaska.
- B. Trip to Sitka by navy plane and inspection of army and navy facilities at Sitka.
- C. Conference with Commander A. J. Isbell and Colonel Adams, respectively in charge of navy and army forces at Sitka.
- D. At Sitka, inspection of salmon canning factory.
- E. Conferences with civilians at Juneau as to conditions in Alaska, including especially censorship, civilian travel, priorities for supplies, wastage on contracts and pirating of labor from one project to another.

Saturday
August 22

At Juneau (Travel postponed because of fog)

- A. Conference with Governor Ernest Greuning and army officers as to civilian and army relations in Alaska.
- B. Inspection of cold storage and fish packing plant.
- C. Inspection of Juneau Alaskan museum and conferences with civilians.
- D. Presence at dance sponsored for enlisted men of the navy the army by the ladies of Juneau.

Sunday
August 23

Juneau to Seattle, Washington

By army plane
900 miles

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At Juneau, inspection of infantry battalion camp protecting airport and conference with Lt. Col. Riegle, commanding.

Monday
August 24 Seattle to San Francisco, Calif.

By Army plane
725 miles

In San Francisco, Senator Chandler rejoined Senators Wallgren and Burton, Senator Holman left the party at Portland, Oregon.

Tuesday
August 25 At San Francisco

Conference with Lt. General John L. De Witt, reviewing results of trip and strategic situation in Alaska.

IV. "ALCAN" ROAD AND IMPROVED AIR TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

One of the most striking changes of attitude by the Army toward Alaska, is in connection with the ALCAN road and improved air transportation facilities. Until recently, the only Army Air Force in Alaska was the purely experimental post established at Ladd Field, Fairbanks, for the purpose of experimenting with the operation of airplanes in cold weather. At the time of the visit of the party to Fairbanks, this use of Ladd Field had, for practical purposes, been discontinued and the entire character of the post at Fairbanks was being changed to that of the Fairbanks Air Depot. This means greatly increased garrisons and facilities. The Depot apparently will be the principal point of distribution in Alaska of air service equipment and supplies. This distribution can be made by rail to and from Anchorage, by airplane in all directions, and, upon completion of the military road, supplies could be brought in and out of Fairbanks on the surface by that road. While lesser points of supply will be maintained, the establishment of this large and apparently

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permanent Depot at Fairbanks is inconsistent with limiting operations in Alaska purely to defensive purposes or treating Alaska as of little importance in the conduct of the war.

While it is apparently the Army policy to concentrate combat forces on the Aleutians and points further south, rather than at Fairbanks, it seems clear that the establishment of Fairbanks Air Depot is an important and valuable step in establishing a useable chain of airports reaching through Alaska to Siberia. This chain is essential for the use of any Ferrying Command in transporting planes and supplies to Russia by air by this route. This chain also will be of substantial value in any offensive operations to be conducted by the United States either through Siberia or along the Aleutian Islds. toward Japan. Finally, this chain is of importance to the permanent development of Alaska by providing increased facilities for travel and transportation of passengers and freight not only through Alaska, but into and out of Alaska in connection with its own development.

A chain of military airports is being completed up through Canada to Fairbanks and Nome. The complete list of these airports is available at the War Department.

As a vital part of this series of military airports, the new ALCAN road is important as a military road to connect these airports.

An important reason for the location of the southerly portion of this road East of the mountain range, is that the flying conditions are much better there than to the West of such mountains. The air route, at least for military purposes, has been placed in this area of better flying and the military surface road is placed there to serve these airports. This road is intended primarily as a military road and it is generally understood that its

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location was selected with that in mind. Among the primary considerations for its location were its availability to the airports, its use of existing connecting roads as far as possible, and the consequent possibility of putting it into use for military purposes as soon as possible.

The road is being opened as a military road by Army Engineers under the direction of Brigadier General W. M. Hoge, whom the Committee interviewed at Whitehorse. He has taken no part in and expresses no opinion upon the general location of the southerly portion of this road which has been a matter of public controversy. He has received his instructions to build the road at the location selected and is proceeding to do so with the utmost speed and with highly commendable vigor and efficiency. He is working simultaneously on the road at five or six separate places. He is encountering substantial difficulties, especially on account of the frozen sub-soil which is constantly melting at certain points. This, however, he anticipated and finds it possible to overcome. He expects to open the road for military uses some time during the month of November. If possible, it will open on or about the first of that month. In spite of the reports to the contrary, General Hoge gave it as his opinion that the road could be maintained and kept open through the entire year. In winter it would be readily passable and at other times of the year when the road bed would thaw out, he regarded the availability of the road as depending primarily upon the vigor and amount of maintenance given to it. He did not regard the difficulties of maintenance as insuperable.

Private contracts have been let to proceed with the finishing of this road subsequent to its initial opening for military uses by the Engineer

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where the cost of transportation of equipment and the employment of civilian labor is difficult, it is important that the contract cost be carefully supervised. It will be easy to waste millions of dollars on this road, but at the same time it will be necessary to expend large sums, even under the best of supervision.

The money has not yet been spent and it is an appropriate time to investigate both the policies which have been or may be adopted and the efficiency with which these policies are carried out.

The cost of the services rendered by the Army Engineer Corps should be included in any study of this road, both because of their own importance and because of their value in determining the propriety of the expenditures under private contract.

The Sub-Committee therefore recommends that the full Committee take under consideration the advisability of undertaking an investigation of the justifiability of one or more Alaskan roads including the one now under construction and also the justifiability of the expenditures already made or likely to be made in connection with such roads.

This examination will take on special significance, not only because of its importance to the war program and especially to the new use of Alaska as a highway to Asia, but because of the importance that a properly located road system bears to the future development of Alaska and to the value of every resource of Alaska which is thus brought nearer to a market.

As a third important element in the new transportation program through Alaska, there should be included the ALCOL pipe line. This involves the plan to secure petroleum from the Norman Wells and to pipe it to

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refineries to be constructed at Whitehorse, Y. T. It came to the attention of the Committee that for a long time oil has been known to exist in the Northwest Territory and that the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey has developed wells adequate for the limited demand in the Northwest Territory near the Great Bear Lake. It now appears that oil is available at the rate of 800 barrels per day and probably soon will be available at over 3000 barrels per day from wells in this vicinity. Under a contract, whereby the Government pays a contract price (understood to be \$1.50 per barrel) to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the Government has secured what it believes to be important rights at a favorable price to take whatever quantities of this oil it needs by pipe line to refineries to be erected by it at Whitehorse.

In the meantime, Whitehorse is to be used as a sort of depot for oil and high octane gasoline. Pending the establishment of the refinery and the completion of the pipe lines from Norman Wells, these supplies would come in over the railroad from Skagway.

It is estimated that the pipe line and the refinery will be ready before the end of 1943. In view of the large scale development involved and its importance to the air transportation service, as well as the need for establishing some standard of judgment as to the cost of the gasoline under the new system as compared with the present cost, the Sub-Committee recommends that this project be included in the general study recommended of the new transportation program in Alaska, including therefor not only the ALCAN highway and related road connections, but also the ALCOL project.

There seems to have been some difference of point of view between

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the Department of Interior, which is interested in deriving oil from Alaska itself, and the War Department on some phases of this project.

In connection with this whole investigation, it is important to bear in mind that most of this work is being done and will be permanently located within the Dominion of Canada. Accordingly, it is important that definite agreements be reached with Canada so that after the expenditure of the money and efforts which will be required of the United States in establishing these roads and developments, the United States have some definite assurance as to our permanent right to make use of these improvements.

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V. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE PROGRAM FOR ALASKA

A. Northern and Central Alaska

Northern and Central Alaska include the route for the Ferrying Command and the important air and surface transportation program previously discussed. This area, however, is regarded by the Western Defense Command as not requiring substantial immediate protection against local attack. None of the airfields in Canada are provided with American troops for defensive purposes nor apparently with any substantial anti-aircraft equipment or personnel. At Whitehorse, Y.T., which is 200 miles East of the Alaskan border and at the head of the railroad from Skagway, we found no local protection except that of two Royal Canadian Mounted Policemen. A similar situation existed at Watson Lake.

At Fairbanks and Nome, the anti-aircraft and defense forces were extremely limited. This is justified by the Western Defense Command on the ground that this area is protected by the line of defense based upon the Aleutian Islands and by the coast and harbor defenses along the southerly border of Alaska. There may be difference of opinion as to the adequacy of this defense. However, if given only the present total forces for Alaska, military considerations may well require them to be disposed as they are.

B. Aleutian Islands and Southerly Coast of Alaska

This is obviously an important All-American front. It is important not only in the defense of Alaska, but in the national defense program affecting the United States itself and especially the

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Pacific Coast. This includes light metal, shipbuilding, aviation and power plants located there. These essential productive agencies, as well as the importance of the Pacific Coast territory itself, make it necessary to include the safety of this area in the consideration of any National Defense or War Program.

If this area is to be in substantial danger of destructive raids or actual invasion, consideration should be given to the relocation of the vital industries now located on the Pacific Coast. On the other hand, in view of the extent of the natural resources and established industries on the Pacific Coast, it would be far more practical and desirable to insure their reasonable defense where they are than to consider their relocation.

In the confidential report submitted by this Sub-Committee on August 5, 1942, as to conditions on the Pacific Coast, the inadequacy of the protection of vital facilities on the Pacific Coast, at least from danger by air raids, was made clear. Emphasis was placed also on the fact that in the consideration of any major operation, including any invasion or extensive hostile bombing operation, it is necessary to consider the defenses in Alaska. The trip of this Sub-Committee to Alaska was especially intended in part to consider this feature of the War Program.

This Sub-Committee finds that while great progress has been made recently, especially with the Army's Defense Program along the Aleutian Islands and Southerly Coast of Alaska, there is need for additional defensive equipment even at these places and there is

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especial need of additional aircraft and air personnel to defend this area. It is further the conclusion of this Sub-Committee that Alaska should not be forced to assume a purely defensive position within its own limits, but should be regarded also as a base for offensive operations.

Military questions such as this will be given consideration by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and undoubtedly will be included in any report rendered to that Committee by its Sub-Committee which visited Alaska on this trip. The observations of the present Sub-Committee on these questions, however, also are material to the consideration of the National Defense and War Program by the Truman Committee. On these primarily military issues, with the possible exception of that of unity of command, the Truman Committee might well decide not to take independent action if the Committee on Military Affairs decides to act on the same subject. The military questions presented by the trip are presented under the following headings:

1. Alaska as an All-American front.
2. Value of early offensive action as compared with purely defensive or delayed offensive action, especially in the Aleutians.
3. Value of Alaska as a direct route to the heart of Japan.
4. Need for greater unity of command both between and within the services.
5. Need for additional air forces.
6. Needs of the other branches of the service.
7. Morale.
8. Needs of the civilian population.

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1. Alaska as an All-American front.

Alaska is on the front line in the war between Japan and the United States and, for practical purposes, the defense of Alaska rests solely with the United States. If Russia were to join in our war against Japan, Alaska would become an even more important front as this would make available important Siberian air bases for our attacks on Japan or for Japan's attacks on us, if Japan captured the bases. If Russia were to withdraw from the whole war, Alaska would become a more difficult and dangerous front for us to defend. It then would be necessary to provide adequate defense for Northern and Central Alaska as well as for the Aleutians and the Southerly Pan handle.

The Alaskan theatre of war has no such influential advocates as Prime Minister Churchill or Dictator Stalin. Those men are personally concerned with other fronts and naturally are seeking every possible support for those fronts.

Canada apparently will cooperate with us up to her limited means. This cooperation, however, will be of comparatively small weight in the actual defense of Alaska, except for the permission to move our troops and equipment through Alaska. While the responsibility for military action in Alaska rests with the United States, there comes with it an exceptional opportunity to conduct the war at least on that front in a typically American manner. America will be responsible both for the strategy and the actual fighting on this front. This is an exceptional opportunity for the demonstration not merely of the courage and capacity of our own fliers, sailors and soldiers, but also ~~for the use of~~ aggressive tactics which should be characteristic of the United States and to which the spirit of our forces is best adapted.

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2. Value of early offensive action as compared to purely defensive or delayed offensive action, especially in the Aleutians.

If adequately equipped with land-based air forces and prepared positions, it should be possible for us to defend Alaska successfully from direct attack. However, in view of the great expanse of Alaska and of its long uninhabited shore line, initial attacks are likely to be made on it at unprotected points on the shore or in the unsettled interior.

When war was declared, Alaska was completely unprepared either for defensive or offensive action. Great progress has been made in improving the defenses of Alaska. At present, with the addition of a comparatively small number of airplanes and troops, Alaska can be reasonably well defended except against a major action or an extraordinary surprise raid. There is, however, a danger that the enemy with a substantial number of airplanes might try to seize airfields built for our own forces. If the enemy were to seize these, they could be used as bases for land based long range bombers to reach into key positions within the United States itself. That such a type of procedure is not beyond the contemplation of the enemy is known from the fact that the enemy already has completed a series of preliminary steps, publicized several years ago, for Japan's conquest of the Pacific. The steps already taken were to be followed by the seizure of Alaska and the Pacific Coast. Such action by the enemy could be effectively prevented and forestalled if Alaska were treated by us not merely as a defensive but as an offensive front.

The enemy already has seized three of the Westerly Aleutian Islands. On at least two of these he is busily engaged in consolidating

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his positions. This action may well reflect his original plan to seize Dutch Harbor. That seizure evidently was prevented by the fact that without Japan's knowledge, we had completed at least one new air base which made that seizure by them impractical. If, however, we are now to take a purely defensive course, the enemy will consolidate his position on the island of Kiska instead of the island of Unalaska, which he first attacked. He will thus gain a base of substantial value to him, and will be able to proceed from there.

Positions on these islands become greatly more difficult to dislodge as their defenses are improved. If we are to take action against the enemy, it will be much easier to do so now than later and our success now would completely dislodge the enemy from any base from which to raid or invade Alaska, or from which to operate in seizing additional islands for those purposes. If Alaska, at a later date, is to be our route to Siberia or to Japan, our securing of the entire Aleutian chain for ourselves now, would far outweigh any effort that would be required for the purpose.

Major benefits can be gained now with a minimum of effort. Later, it may take a major action to secure the same benefits. The burden of the engagement, be it minor or major, will be borne by our own troops. It will be our own foresight, or lack of it, that will determine the cost, in life and equipment, of our delays.

3. Value of Alaska as a direct route to the heart of Japan.

Regardless of what may happen in Europe, it is likely that Japan will continue its war against us unhampered by internal trouble comparable

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to those that will face Hitler. The defeat of Japan is likely to be difficult and dependent on our efforts. If we are to attempt to recapture, island by island, and fort by fort, each of the places that the Japanese seized in the Southern Pacific, we will find that they have been converted into strongholds that will present much greater difficulties to the attacking force than they did in the first instance. The Japanese will be ready and able to defend these chosen positions.

On the other hand, if Japan can be struck at home, these defensive positions to the South will then be cut off from the rear. The major strategy in our war with Japan would seem to involve at some time as direct an attack on Japan itself as is possible. This should be a typically American attack involving great reliance upon our Air Forces. The base for such an attack would be Siberia or Alaska or both. It is important, therefore, that Alaska and the Aleutian chain be kept completely within our own control so as to keep their use available to us for a major action.

Action on this front on a large scale, based on improved Alaskan transportation facilities, even as early as next year, should be given consideration as providing a front for offensive action, of equal importance with any in Europe or Asia, to the United States of America.

4. Need for greater unity of command both between and within the services.

The higher officers both in the Army and the Navy on the Western Coast and in Alaska, are entitled to credit for their obvious determination to cooperate and get along together in spite of the equally obvious

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handicap of divided and shifting commands in Alaska. The Committee reviewed the problem of unity of command, both between and within the services, with substantially every commanding officer it met. In each case some degree of unity and complete cooperation was claimed. On the other hand, it always took a long time to explain the way the unity of command operated. This, in itself, proved the lack of ^{the} simple unity of command that is essential to the best results.

Assuming that a satisfactory unity of command has been evolved for Panama and Australia, this Sub-Committee believes that a similar unity of command should be evolved for Alaska. The unity should embrace both the Army and the Navy, as well as the several activities of each service in Alaska. The various subdivisions could still remain under separate subordinate commands, but Alaska is a "separate front", and ^{an} "All-American Front", and it should have the benefit of separate single effective leadership.

The selection of the Commander is necessarily one for executive decision, and is not discussed by this Sub-Committee.

The situation as it now stands was explained to the Sub-Committee substantially as follows:

If our position is purely defensive, then there is a general rule that as long as it is a defense on the water, the command shall vest in the Navy. If the defense shall be on land, the command shall vest in the Army. Under the present circumstances, the enemy is still on the water and therefore Alaska is in the state of a combat zone, with a "fleet opposed" invasion in progress against it. Primary command is therefore

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now vested in the Navy. It is obvious that a major portion of the defense, especially if the attacks and raids are made by air, falls upon the Army, which greatly outnumbers the Navy in Alaska, both in number of airplanes, anti-aircraft guns and ground forces. The command, however, will not shift to the Army until the invasion has become a "land opposed invasion". If the attacks are made on us primarily by air there will be considerable doubt as to when the command does shift.

This is by no means the most serious part of the problem of unity of command under present conditions. It is obvious that the above rules look to a defensive rather than an offensive program. Neither the Army nor the Navy, alone, is free to determine when it is advisable to undertake an offensive program. An offensive action by us will be a joint action and therefore a decision from our Joint Chiefs of Staff, or our Commander in Chief himself, is necessary to bring it about.

When and if an offensive action is determined upon, under present conditions, it involves an attack by us moving from one small island to another. Under these circumstances the rule is that the Navy shall have command of the offensive until such time as the land is seized and the troops are on it. Command of the troops on land, will then be returned to the commander of the Army, although it may be difficult to pick the moment at which the command automatically passes to him. There may be difficulty in convincing the Naval Commander that his command has ended, although the Army commander may be convinced that the time has come for his command to begin.

A further and even more serious difficulty arises when it becomes

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important to decide quickly upon carrying the attack to still another island. While recognizing the need for joint navy and army action and the usual need to reorganize the movement before making a second advance, nevertheless, the speed of such action may mean the difference between an easy or extremely costly attack. Under the present rules, before the next attack could be undertaken, it would be necessary for the Naval Commander to resume command and decide to go ahead. At the same time, the Army Commander, then in full command of his land forces, might feel that it was not wise either to abandon the island which he had just captured or to weaken its defenses. A similar situation might arise, in reverse, if the Army Commander were to feel that in order properly to defend his island he should at once attack another beyond it, and the Navy Commander were to decline to lead such an additional action.

This system of shifting commands between the Army and the Navy, without even considering the complications incidental to the use of the air force, can not be satisfactory. It is important that there be a unity of command which will include control, under all circumstances, over all of our forces in a given area whether they be on the water, on the land, or in the air.

In view of the scale of Alaskan operations that may be involved in the future, it is important that a unity of command be created that will vest the responsibility for the entire Alaskan front in one officer.

While the above is a concrete illustration of the need for unity of command on a particular front, it suggests a broader question of great fundamental importance, namely, the unity of command of the Army, Navy and Air Forces for our whole war time effort.